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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates DATE: 13 December 1949

FROM : Chief, Transportation Division, ORE

SUBJECT: A Concept of National Intelligence Production on the Far East

1. Pursuant to EPB Notice No. 2-49 of 9 December 1949, the following comments are submitted with regard to Tab A "A Concept of National Intelligence Production on the Far East."

2. I am in general agreement with the subject document, but believe that a rearrangement of the paper and a redraft of some portions would increase its effectiveness. By being organized into (a) statement of the problem, (b) discussion, (c) conclusions and (d) recommendations, the paper takes the form of a document which arrives at certain conclusions after presenting the necessary supporting arguments to prove the validity of the conclusions. Actually, however, the discussion contained in paragraphs b, c, and d of paragraph 2 is so brief that it constitutes little more than comments on the various conclusions. The assumptions, moreover, are essentially statements of fact which, ^{whether} proven or accepted without proof, serve to substantiate the conclusions. This applies particularly to the first assumption. The conventional use of assumptions, however, in documents of this type, is for the purpose of arbitrarily limiting the scope of what would otherwise be an unmanageably broad problem.

³ ~~chosen for~~ In view of the foregoing, I believe that one of two alterations ^{native} should be made in the paper; either the substantiating arguments should be expanded to several times its present length and really prove the case contained in the conclusions, or the conclusions should start off the paper (in which case the statement of the ~~paper~~ ^{problem} becomes unnecessary) and the present descriptive matter should follow the conclusions as a brief commentary.

4. Regardless of any rearrangement of the material which may be carried out, the following modifications and amplifications are recommended:

Assumption (1) - To describe the foreign policy of the US as a ?
"struggle for power with the USSR" does not seem to be a lofty description of our international objectives. I suggest the following text:

"The security objectives of the United States in the Far East cannot be satisfactorily established except in the context of the world-wide tension caused by the aggressive foreign policy of the USSR and its exploitation of international Communism to further its advance to world domination."

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Assumption (2) "Unless a basis for mutual accommodation between the US and USSR is found, mounting tension will inevitably result in . . .".

I am confused as to whether sub-paragraph (b) under Assumption (2) is intended to refer only to the Far East or whether it applies to ^{the} world position of the two powers generally. The present phraseology appears to cover the US to the same extent that it refers to the USSR, although the further contents of the paper do not give any indication of possible developments which might produce an accumulation by the US of elements of power which ^{would} eventually nullify the will and capacity of the USSR to resist. If the paragraph refers only to the possibility of increasing Soviet power, it should be entirely redrafted, possibly as follows: Assumption 2 (b) "The gradual accumulation by the USSR on terms short of war of elements of power in the Far East, including limited armed force, which may eventually nullify the will and capacity of the US to resist further Soviet expansion in that area."

Conclusion 3 a. "Possibilities for control in the Far East, to include: (1) Vulnerability of the Far East, area by area, to control unfavorable to the US or to action by the US calculated to increase its influence in the formulation of national policies in these areas. (2) Capabilities for the acquisition and exercise of control in the Far East and for the interdiction by the USSR of any US plans designed to increase its influence in the area. (3) (Note: This is new text) Prevailing circumstances and probable trends in the Far East which can throw light on the capabilities of the US to deny control of the area to the USSR or to institute successful action for the increase of its own influence in the area."

Conclusion 3 b. "Potentialities of the Far East in War and Peace, including: (1) The possibility of the formation of a comprehensive war-making complex in the Far East, independent from, but potentially able to support (a) other centers of Soviet power, or (b) the US." (Note: Careful study of all factors may lead to the conclusion that certain areas are most likely to form a war-making complex in potential support of the USSR while other areas can organize resources of direct military value to the US.)

Conclusion 3 b. (2) "The probable existence or emergence in the Far East" (remainder of sentence as now drafted).

The foregoing suggestions for changes in the conclusions are based on the obvious possibility that the US, as well as the USSR, may take positive action to achieve desirable objectives in the Far East. Generally speaking, the conclusions as now drafted give consideration only to possible action by the USSR. It would be manifestly unsound for US planning echelons to discard the possibility of US positive

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action without having considered the problem. For such consideration, however, intelligence estimates as to vulnerability, susceptibility, etc. of various areas to given courses of US action are essential.



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